By many accounts, ethnic relations at the state level have deteriorated even further since the war [1]. As the 20th anniversary of Bosnia’s Dayton Peace Agreement approaches, the view that Dayton produced a “dead peace” for Bosnia is common. With no alternative constitution in immediate view, the structural barriers to state integration, social peace and reconciliation leave the country in a state of limbo, or as some have called Bosnia’s “purgatory” (McRobie, 25 Mar 2014).
Another Perspective on Peacebuilding in Bosnia-Herzegovina
I would argue that all is not entirely bleak and that success grows from recognition. Twenty years on Bosnia has made important progress on various fronts towards reconstruction, peace and reconciliation. For those who witnessed the utter devastation of Bosnia’s infrastructure during or shortly after the war, the physical reconstruction of the country is impressive and fairly universal throughout the country: hundreds of thousands of houses, schools, public and state building, roads, commercial buildings, etc. have been rebuilt to a good standard. Nor are people killing each other; indeed, the country is quite a safe place to live – much safer indeed than many developed countries in other parts of the world. Physical and social spaces are transforming. Civil society continues to develop steadily. And even army barracks have been converted into university campuses.
While ethnic groups remain geographically concentrated due to the war, there is also a great deal of inter-ethnic interaction, professional cooperation (both face-to-face and virtual), and a still-significant number of ‘mixed’ families and their social networks. Post-war priorities including the restoration of freedom of movement between the country’s ‘entities’, the restitution of illegally confiscated property, the resettlement of refugees and returnees, longer-term integration-promoting reforms such as the harmonization of employment laws and education standards, the post-war spread of information technology and the introduction of such technologies into schools around the country, have gradually enabled war-segregated populations to meet, communicate, re-integrate and resume increasingly ‘normal’ economic and social relations (Armakolas’ chapter in Bougarel, 2007).
Most importantly, in the face of ethnocentric politics persist, there is evidence in all spheres of what Koulind (2007) calls the development of “counter-discourses” that “call into question the ethnicization of everyday life”. In both overt and subtle forms, these counter-discourses “render ethnic categories more complex and flexible, and facilitate the creation of new spaces and new forms of peaceful coexistence.” (Koulind’s chapter in Bougarel, 2007).
These various shifts in the Bosnian post-war context over time and their cumulative effects—both negative and positive—give rise to new concerns and new opportunities for conflict transformation and peacebuilding in a general sense, and in educational contexts specifically.
Bosnia’s Nascent ‘Spring’: Violent Protests and Grassroots Democracy
Against this backdrop, an exciting development in 2014 was that Bosnian citizens began to take social, economic and political affairs into their own hands. In early February, violent riots swept cities across the country, drawing both praise and criticism from domestic and international observers. On the whole, however, most commentators have praised Bosnians for taking to the streets, calling the events the beginnings of a “Bosnian Spring” [2] after 20 years of post-war sleep [3].
The protests first broke out in the industrial town of Tuzla, and then rapidly spread to Sarajevo, Zenica, Bihac, Mostar, and other towns across the Croat-Bosniak Federation, with ‘solidarity’ protests taking place in Banja Luka and neighbouring countries of Serbia and Croatia. Tens of thousands of protesters gathered in the streets. Motivating the riots were failed privatizations of several major state-owned factories, which caused thousands of workers to lose their jobs, pensions, and health care. As the protests continued however, they quickly transformed into a general expression of dissatisfaction with the state, citing years of corruption, economic decay and in-fighting among ethno-political elites.
In the past few years, smaller-scale protests have occurred, particularly in the state capital Sarajevo. Protests by veterans’ associations, teachers’ unions, and citizens’ groups have demanded fuller rights, increased compensation, and more effective governance. But while protests, pickets, hunger strikes, and sit-ins have become more common, they have been largely ignored by the authorities. Against this backdrop, the recent protests differed in several important respects: 1) their scale and violence; 2) the use of poverty as a unifying pan-ethnic discourse; 3) the organization of citizens’ plenums as a direct democratic process for reclaiming governance; 4) the impact of the protests on their own elected officials, and 5) on international policy discourse.
Scale and violence: The riots became violent in most cities, with citizens damaging municipal, cantonal and state government buildings. Frustrated with the country’s stalled post-war recovery, protestors attacked government and political party offices, several of which were set on fire. Never since the war has such public aggression occurred. “Prior to all of this most analysts would have claimed that this kind of uprising was impossible because the people are passive, inert and divided by nationalism” (Kapović, 2014, Feb 12).
Activists within the protest movement rapidly created logos, websites, Facebook pages, Twitter accounts and mini-documentaries to rally support, disseminate news and articulate demands in local and international languages, thereby lending momentum to the movement. [4]
Poverty as the unifying pan-ethnic discourse: Poverty-induced desperation and rage against state abuse power were the overriding themes. The message of activists behind the riots is dissatisfaction with government corruption leading to high pay-offs for politicians while near 40% of the population is jobless and living in poverty. As one protestor explained, “The people have nothing to eat, people are hungry, young people do not have jobs, there is no healthcare insurance, no basic rights. It can't get any worse.” [5] They emphasized those on the street represent all ethnic communities [6] and that their protest is not ethnically-motivated but rather a socio-economic revolt against the ruling class.
The protestors are thus seen activating Koulind’s ‘counter-discourses’, rejecting the ethnicization of their actions despite attempts by political parties to recast the frustration as an attempt by certain ethnic groups to destabilize the country. Slogans such as “Death to nationalism” (Kapović, 2014, Feb 12) alongside warnings such as “He who sows hunger reaps anger” and “This is the beginning of your end” were scrawled on government buildings. And mocking the divisive ethnopoliticization of the country’s language variants, several protest banners read “We are hungry in all three languages!” (FENA, 2014, Feb 11).
Organization of citizens’ plenums as a direct democratic process for reclaiming governance: The most surprising aspect of the recent riots was the rapid “birth of direct democratic assemblies” which have “taken everybody by complete surprise” (Kapović, 2014, Feb 22). Citizens plenums were formed in not less than 15 regions including Tuzla [7], Sarajevo, Zenica, Mostar, Travnik, Brčko, Goražde, Konjic, Cazin, Donji Vakuf, Fojnica, Orašje and Bugojno. Larger “joint plenums” were also organized inter-regionally as the protest movement gathered momentum.
Initially meeting daily, the ‘Citizens’ Plenums’ offered direct democratic fora for citizens of all walks of life to state their grievances and their demands for the reorganization of the country, without fear or restriction. Attended by scores of individuals, the plenums met peacefully in crowded halls and stadiums. Resembling a form of ‘town hall meeting’ or ‘citizens’ assembly’ the plenums drew their inspiration from those created in neighbouring Croatia during university protests in 2009 and later the same year in Tuzla itself (Kapović, 2014, Feb 22). These earlier experiences “gave birth to a group of young people who started thinking politically and trying to create a better future for the country” (Eminagic, 7 Mar 2014). Eminagic has called the plenums “liberating” discursive spaces which create “therapeutic” communicative interactions that “people did not have access to in the past twenty years” (Eminagic, 7 Mar 2014). Cautionary remarks towards plenums has focussed on problems of limited representativeness, scalability and sustainability, however they did succeeded in delivering articulate demands to their governments.
Grassroots impact on elected officials: Shaken by the boldness of the protestor’ actions and demands, four Cantonal governments resigned from office within days. A new government comprised on politically non-aligned ‘experts’ was formed in Tuzla canton. And some cantonal law reforms have already been adopted, including removing the right of politicians to receive salaries for a year after the end of their term in office (Jukic, 2014, Apr 18). Ripple effects have been felt in the ethnically-divided city of Mostar as well. After dividing the city’s power and stalling the city’s development for over 6 years, the two main ethnically-based parties—SDA and HDZ— agreed in April to a strategic partnership “so that relations of the two ethnic groups may relax” and economic development can be prioritized (Jukic, 2014, Apr 9).
Impacts on international policy discourse: Although the protests have since quieted down [8], they succeeded in awakening state and international authorities to the power and risk of a mobilized Bosnian citizenry. Indeed, this wave of citizen action has reminds the international community that statebuilding and peacebuilding in Bosnia is not ‘done’. For a short time, at least, the riots caught a listening ear. They have convinced erstwhile disdainful European governments to renew their commitment to Bosnia’s development priorities and have re-opened debate on the country’s political and economic future.
Beyond Ethnicity
More importantly, perhaps, the protests underscore that peacebuilding in Bosnia must not revolve around the language of ethnicity alone, as scholars and policymakers have tended to treat the matter. Insistence on ethnicity discourses as the pivot basis for peacebuilding is regarded by many Bosnians as reinforcing rather than bridging divisions. A great part of the frustration in Bosnian society was and continues to be the use of ethnicity by politicians as a proxy for fighting wars over territorial, economic and political power. Bougarel and colleagues (2007) speak to this analytical and political flaw, this ‘ethnic bias’, and argue that analyses of the Bosnian context and engagement with the country’s social, political, and educational challenges need to look ‘beyond ethnicity’.
[1] See “Fragile States: Continuing Struggles for Bosnia and Herzegovina” by Jason Maloney and Kira Kay, 2009
[2] Documentary: Bosnia and Herzegovina in Spring http://vimeo.com/89711771
[3] 07 Feb 14 The ‘Bosnian Spring’ Starts With a Bang. Accessed 03.03.2014: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/the-bosnian-spring-starts-with-bang
See also It's spring at last in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Accessed 25.04.2014 from http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/02/it-spring-at-last-bosnia-herzegov-2014296537898443.html
[4] Some examples : Sarajevo Plenum http://plenumsa.org/ , Tuzla Plenum https://www.facebook.com/plenumTK , BH Protest Files https://bhprotestfiles.wordpress.com/about/
[5] 06 Feb 14 New Protest Clashes Erupt in Bosnia’s Tuzla. Accessed 03.03.2014: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/bosnians-head-for-another-day-of-protests?utm_source=Balkan+Insight+Newsletters&utm_campaign=de43f0b007-BI_DAILY&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_4027db42dc-de43f0b007-319682905
[6] 13 Feb 14 Can the Revolt in Bosnia and Herzegovina Send a Message To the Wider World? Accessed 03.03.2014: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/blog/can-the-revolt-in-bosnia-and-herzegovina-send-a-message-to-the-wider-world
[7] “Tuzla, the center and starting point of the protests, where the protesters were most articulated and most organized from the start” (Kapović, 2014, Feb 22)
[8] Some point to the lack a unifying leader and ideology to maintain momentum (Jukic, 2014, Apr 18)